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METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE DUAL INHERITANCE 
ACCOUNT OF HUMAN EVOLUTION
PAULO C. ABRANTES*
Dual inheritance theory is one of the main contemporary approaches 
to hum an evolution. It is actually an aggregate of various theories, 
and I have no intention of appraising them all here—my focus is, 
rather, m ethodological.1
Richerson and Boyd are stimulating in this regard, since they are 
they are willing to make explicit the methodological underpinnings 
of their work. Their second order discourse is intended to provide 
justification of the methods, conceptual tools, cognitive aims, etc., 
that are deployed in their properly scientific business.
Richerson and Boyd’s m ethods and their methodological views 
(that is, their theory of m ethod) will be illustrated with their account 
of the evolution of social learning by imitation.2 I will highlight, es­
pecially, the way in which they use mathematical models, empirical 
data—of different kinds— and intuitions, responding to different in­
quiries.
Dual inheritance theory ( d i t )  is overarching: it deals with all the 
central issues about hum an evolution. How does one devise such a 
theory, aimed at explaining complex phenom ena of various kinds? A 
straightforward answer would be: constructing realistic models in an 
attem pt to m irror the complexity of the phenom ena.
Richerson and Boyd argue that we should strive, instead, to build 
simple models of different aspects of the phenom ena under investi­
gation. The final theory, composed of those simple models, m ight be
* University of Brasilia, Brazil.
1 For a critical overview of Richerson and Boyd’s theory, see Abrantes and Portela, 
2011.
2 What I call “imitation” here refers to the same modality of social learning named 
by some authors “true imitation” or “observational learning”. It will be clear in what fol­
lows that there are other modalities of social learning besides imitation, but those are 
not able to support a new inheritance system and, therefore, cultural accumulation.
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complex after all. They are here advocating a methodology inspired 
by Leibenstein (1976).
Leibenstein conceives theories as a set of relations in which param­
eters are “sufficiently specified” so that they assert something “about 
the world of facts” (1976: 17). This is not the case with “analytical 
frameworks [which] may be looked upon as the mold out of which 
the specific types of theories are m ade.” Hence, theories are falsifiable 
but not analytical frameworks that “may be looked upon as toolboxes 
from which we can fashion theories to explain events, but they are not 
themselves theories” (p. 18). Leibenstein calls these structures fash­
ioned out of analytical frameworks “sample theories” or alternatively 
“sample models.”3
Following quite closely Leibenstein’s “theory of theories,” Richer- 
son and Boyd argue that instead of complex models, in certain ar­
eas the aim should be to grasp several purportedly similar processes 
through building sample theories:
Students of complex and diverse subject matters develop a large body of 
models from which “samples” can be drawn for the purpose at hand. Useful 
sample theories result from attempts to satisfy two competing desiderata: 
they should be simple enough to be clearly and completely grasped, and 
at the same time they should reflect how real processes actually do work, 
at least to some approximation. A systematically constructed population of 
sample theories and combinations of them constitutes the theory of how the 
whole complex process works (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 404).
This is not a theory as it has been conceived by several generations 
of philosophers of science. In particular, Richerson and Boyd’s view is 
certainly not captured by the received view of the structure of scien­
tific theories. But it seems they are also arguing for something quite 
different from a semantic view of theories:
3 Leibenstein’s 1976 book has a whole chapter on what one could call the philosophy 
o f economic science. He conceives “sample models” as resulting from “analytical frame­
works [and] should be seen as containing sample propositions. These propositions are 
essentially relationships that in themselves are not necessarily true. They are samples 
in the sense that they suggest the form that the theory should take..” (p. 22). Later on, 
some relationships in those sample models can be specified; but “in the absence of 
specific studies, or in the absence of specific policy situations, the sample theories are 
not to be looked upon as working theories but simply as illustrations of the kinds of 
working models that could be created” (p. 26).
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The study of complex, diverse phenomena like organic evolution requires 
complex, multilevel theories b u t... such theories are best built from toolkits 
made up of a diverse collection of simple models. Because individual mod­
els in the toolkit are designed to provide insight into only selected aspects 
of the more complex whole, they are necessarily incomplete. Nevertheless, 
students of complex phenomena aim for a reasonably complete theory by 
studying many related simple models (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 397, my 
emphasis).
These knowledge structures and the associated methods are con­
sidered adequate to the biological and also the social sciences.4 How­
ever, it is commonplace in the latter to dismiss the usefulness and 
applicability of a mathematical language (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 
377).
It is undeniable that we are much more used to verbal arguments 
than to mathematical-formal ones. Richerson and Boyd point out, 
however, the limitations of verbal descriptions: they usually have a 
qualitative character whereas reality has quantitative dimensions. Be­
sides that, natural languages are plagued with ambiguity; the words 
we use often take different meanings in different contexts.5
In what follows I will present Richerson and Boyd’s justifications 
for what I will call a “sample methodology”: the use of simple and 
mathematical models to understand complex processes, such as hu­
man evolution.
COMPLEX OR SIMPLE MODELS?
The drawbacks of complex models are the following:
a] They are hard to understand:
4 It is debatable whether these structures and methods are also typical in sciences, 
such as physics, which was the reference for most philosophers of science in the last 
century.
5 However, Richerson and Boyd acknowledge that to give a verbal description (prose 
explanation) of the mathematical models can be helpful. It is a way of examining the 
acceptability of particular presuppositions, avoiding the risks of the “garbage in, gar­
bage out” phenomenon, associated with mathematical-deductive reasoning (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1985: 30; Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 433).
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To substitute an ill-understood model of the world for the ill-understood 
world is not progress. In the end, the only way to understand how such a 
model works is to abstract pieces from it or study simplified cases where its 
behavior is more transparent. Even when complex models are useful, they 
are so because we understand how they work in terms of simple models ab­
stracted from them (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 402).
Richerson and Boyd argue that understanding is the chief epistem- 
ic virtue in scientific activity, but it m ight betray engrained habits of 
thought. The historical case of William Thomson complaining about 
his difficulties in intuitively grasping Maxwell’s electromagnetic the­
ory comes to my mind. W. Thom pson required that every acceptable 
theory in physics should be constructed out of mechanical models, 
which could be more easily visualized (at least for him, used to work­
ing with this kind of models in agreem ent with a mechanistic image 
of nature).
Richerson and Boyd seemingly are not committed to any particu­
lar image of nature—the use of simple models is just “tactical.” None­
theless, there is a defense of this methodology that has to do with our 
cognitive limitations.
b\ Complex models are not adequate to tackle processes which are 
diverse, besides being complex.
Evolutionary processes are of this kind (more on this below), as 
well as those that are studied by the hum an sciences. 
c] Complex models are difficult to analyze.
To work out their implications is a hard task since they use a large 
num ber of variables and presuppose an even larger num ber of rela­
tions between them. Equations in those models usually do not have ex­
act solutions and we have to rely on numerical methods. Even with the 
help of powerful computers this work is time-consuming and costly.
The arguments Richerson and Boyd offer in favor of a sample 
methodology are the following:
a] Simple models help “to school our intuitions” (Boyd and Rich­
erson, 2005: 377; Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 98).
Intuitions are often error prone, especially when we deal with com­
plex systems and processes. Given our cognitive limitations, we cannot 
avoid the use of simple models, after all (Boyd and Richerson, 1985: 
30). They help to prevent the investigator from getting lost in the de­
tails of an intractable complexity, from losing sight of what is relevant
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in the phenom ena under study: “In our own case, at least, the formal 
exercise of reducing intuitive notions to mathematical propositions 
and deriving results has often led to unexpected conclusions” (1985: 
30).
In a m ore recent paper, they are even m ore emphatic about the 
advantages of this methodology:
Bit by bit, models can be used to dissect the logic of complex systems. The 
sharp contrast between the difficulty of making good models and their mani­
fest simplicity compared to the phenomena they seek to understand is a hum­
bling, even spiritual, experience (Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 256).
b] Mathematical models help to check whether our descriptions 
are “deductively sound” (2005: 240).
They compensate for the limitations of our mental powers in de­
ducing the implications of our assumptions (Boyd and Richerson, 
1985: 30) and, therefore, they play a role as “prosthesis” to our minds 
(Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 240). O ur intuitions and verbal descrip­
tions are often inconsistent, but it is difficult to show this inconsistency.
c] Richerson and Boyd emphasize also the role played by sample 
theories in helping to “capture the generic properties of the process­
es of interest” (1985: 24-5).
The diversity of evolutionary processes, for instance, should not 
compromise the quest for generality. Natural selection can be seen as 
a taxonomic construct that discloses the similarities between tokens 
(or sub-types) of various types of processes (e.g. variation, differential 
reproduction, inheritance):
Basic theoretical constructs like natural selection are not universal laws like 
gravitation; rather they are taxonomic entities, general classes of similar pro­
cesses which nonetheless have a good deal of diversity within the class (Boyd 
and Richerson, 1985: 25).
Despite the advantages of this methodology, Richerson and Boyd 
(2005: 377) acknowledge that simple models are limited in their 
predictive power since they are idealized and unrealistic. So the con­
struction of complex models is justified in technological and other 
practical tasks where prediction is at stake (meteorology is a good 
example). However, predictive power is not guaranteed by the use
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of complex models. Besides the problem of com putational power 
availability, for a complex model to make predictions it requires data 
for all the parameters it assumes. These data are, in general, lacking 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985: 26). If this is the case, in using complex 
models “it is easy to make large sacrifices of understanding for small 
gains in predictive power” (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 403).
In any case, prediction should not be privileged in place of ex­
planation and understanding. The latter are “scientifically far more 
fundam ental” (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 403; cf. Leibenstein, 1976: 
12-13). However, the aim of getting understanding through simplicity 
and idealization cannot avoid a minimum com mitm ent to realism:
The sample models are caricatures. If they are well designed, they are like 
good caricatures, capturing a few essential features of the problem in a rec­
ognizable but stylized manner and with no attempt to represent features not 
of immediate interest (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 404).
Some of Richerson and Boyd’s claims disclose an epistemological 
modesty, even a m oderate skepticism concerning the possibility of 
obtaining knowledge—at least in areas like evolutionary biology. In 
the context of their attempts to come up with a theory of cultural dy­
namics, they ask themselves: “Are the models a true depiction of the 
adaptive properties of culture? Unfortunately, we don’t know” (Rich­
erson and Boyd, 2005: 119).
They appeal, again, to our cognitive limitations: “Simple models, 
simple experiments and simple observational programs are the best 
the hum an mind can do in the face of the awesome complexity of 
nature” (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 377).
The fact that science has a pragmatic dimension is also explicitly 
recognized. Models which have shown their fruitfulness in biology 
can be exported to solve problems in other areas.6 W hen Richerson 
and Boyd argue for the application of evolutionary models—taken 
mostly from population genetics, but also from evolutionary game 
theory and decision theory— in explaining phenom ena in the do­
main of the hum an sciences, they plead for a methodological and not 
an ontological stance: Darwinism is just a “tool kit” and not an “uni­
6 For an account of analogical reasoning as a problem-solving strategy, see Abrantes, 
1999.
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versal acid” as D ennett claims (Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 119; Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005: 434; cf. Dennett, 1995). To recognize the heuris­
tic role of Darwinian models does not imply, either, a com mitm ent to 
the universal Darwinism program (Dawkins, 1984; Cziko, 1995, 2001).
Models help to explore the causal intricacy of complex processes, 
separating relevant factors from those that are (shown to be) second­
ary or plainly irrelevant: “The reductionism of evolutionary science is 
purely tactical” (Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 98). Reductionism has a 
“heuristic use” (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 408).
Furthermore, model building does not aim at finding out laws:
...explanatory models are not laws but tools to be taken up or not as the 
situation warrants. Good models are like good tools: they are known to do a 
certain job reasonably well. Simple models that work well for a wide variety 
of jobs are an especially valuable part of the biologist’s tool kit (Boyd and 
Richerson, 2005: 397).
The heuristic role of model failure is also congenial to that sample 
methodology. Wimsatt is a main reference here, explicitly acknowl­
edged by Richerson and Boyd in several of their writings (see Wim- 
satt’s 2007 collection of his papers on this topic).
In the next section I will illustrate Richerson and Boyd’s model­
ing heuristics, as well as some of their methodological theses, in the 
way they conceive a “why-maybe account” (Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 
127) of the origins of culture.7
THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE
What follows is a reconstruction, in the shape of an informal argu­
ment, of Richerson and Boyd’s model building approach to come up 
with a plausible account of the origins of a new modality of inheri­
tance system in the hom inid lineage.8 I will present the chief results
7 Richerson and Boyd’s “why-maybe accounts” are akin to Brandon’s “how possibly 
explanations” (Brandon, 1995; Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 127, 305).
8 It is important not to conflate the question about the origins of culture with a 
totally different one, about cultural evolution. I mentioned before that Richerson and 
Boyd proposed also several models for making the forces responsible for cultural dy­
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of a series of nine models they built to face the conceptual and em­
pirical challenges of an adaptationist stance in dealing with this topic 
(Boyd and Richerson, 2005, caps. 1-3).
In these models, several parameters are m anipulated (often inde­
pendently) in idealized settings:9
1 ] The rate of change of the environment;
2] The num ber of environmental states and the modality of environ­
m ental change—either discrete or continuous;
3] Genotypes for individual learners, imitators or both thought to ex­
ist in the population;
4] Rules employed in social learning—e.g. stipulating whom to copy 
and when;
5] The costs of individual and social learning.
I will start with their definition of culture:10
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that they ac­
quire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and 
other forms of social transmission (Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 5).
This definition grants the existence of culture in many species. 
There are, effectively, other modalities of social transmission besides 
imitation. I will show that the crucial issue in this account is not the 
existence of culture per se, but the possibility of cultural accumulation.
1] Mathematical models built by Richerson and Boyd in 1989 (Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005, cap. 1) showed that, given certain environm en­
tal conditions, observational learning (imitation) does enhance the 
fitness of individuals in a population since it affords an economy of
namics explicit. This task is, however, a different one from that of devising a model of 
how culture, as a new kind of inheritance system, evolved in the first place on top of 
the genetic system!
9 “Tinkering” might be a good word (not employed by Richerson and Boyd, 
though) to describe this kind of experimentation with selected parameters in models 
which picture idealized evolutionary scenarios. Cf. Wimsatt, 2007.
10 “Culture” should be considered a theoretical term, that is, its meaning depends 
on the role this term plays in the d i t .  Many notions of culture have been proposed, and 
they should be understood in the context of different research programs, with their 
particular commitments, problems being addressed, aim, an so on.
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the costs associated with individual learning. Effectively, individual 
learning is error prone; information might not be available for the 
individual by its own; the costs of obtaining information in this way 
might be too high, etc.
Their first model is an exercise on what they call “strategic model­
ing,” often used for behavioral traits (e.g. in behavioral ecology):
In strategic modeling, we begin with the tasks that the environment sets 
for an organism and attempt to deduce how natural selection should have 
shaped the species’ adaptation to its niche [...] This is just the sort of model­
ing we have undertaken in our studies of social learning and culture. We ask: 
how should organisms cope with different kinds of spatially and temporally 
variable environments? (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 75).
----------------------------------- 1-----------------------------------1----------------------------------- r -------------- - ------------------r ,---------------------- * ....." " i ------------------------------------
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Millions of years ago
Figure 1. The world climate in the last six million years plotted against some 
crucial milestones in hominid evolution; from Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 133.
Figure 1 shows how the world climate became more and more vari­
able in the last 6 million years until the Holocene—the starting point 
of a period of stability in which we still live. Their hypothesis is that 
social learning by imitation was an adaptation to cope with those ex­
traordinary conditions.
2] Richerson and Boyd point, however, to a puzzle arising from this 
kind of adaptationist story: “The apparent rarity or at least lack of
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sophistication, of social learning in species besides hum ans is a con­
siderable puzzle given our results” (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 33).
We will see that this “adaptationist puzzle” (Richerson and Boyd, 
2005: 100) is hard to solve, with an unexpected potential for jeopar­
dizing their whole explanatory endeavor.
3] Mathematical m odeling built by Rogers (1988) showed, surpris­
ingly, that at the evolutionary stable situation, imitation actually does 
not increase the fitness of the population as a whole (mean fitness), 
composed of imitators and individual learners (contrary to the intu­
ition grounding Richerson and Boyd’s 1989 models).
The way Rogers himself interprets the implications of his models is 
instructive: “These results [...] contradict the widely held belief that, 
if the capacity for culture evolved through natural selection, then cul­
ture must, on average, enhance fitness” (1988: 6). This idea is certain­
ly a possibility: the fact that a trait is selected for does not guarantee 
that it is adaptive!
Boyd and Richerson (2005, cap. 2) showed with further model­
ing—which handled other param eters in a num ber of different cir­
cumstances— that Rogers’s results are robust despite the idealizations 
he introduced. Figure 2 captures the main result.
Average
Fitness
Figure 2. The fitness of the population as a whole doesn’t increase if there 
are imitators in the population. As the number of imitators increases, their 
fitness decreases gradually and, at the equilibrium point, the average fitness 
is the same as if the population had only individual learners. This model 
presupposes that the fitness of the individual learners is constant, not be­
ing affected by the existence of imitators in the population. From Boyd and 
Richerson, 2005, p. 37.
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Richerson and Boyd looked at this unexpected result as an oppor­
tunity for a deeper understanding of what is at stake:
Alan Rogers’s very simple model in which social learning evolved without be­
ing adaptive led to some real insights into exactly what properties are needed 
for culture to be adaptive. Good models produce diamond-clear deductive in­
sights into the logic of evolutionary processes (Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 
256; emphasis m ine).
Notice that Richerson and Boyd are here effectively making room 
for our intuition that culture is adaptive! It can be form ulated as fol­
lows: hum ans present exceptional plasticity in their behavior com­
pared to o ther primates. This trait made possible an extraordinary 
geographical spread. Culture comes up immediately as a proximate 
cause of this adaptability (other explanations would appeal to the 
genes, the environm ent or both).
4] If we start with the intuition that culture is in fact adaptive, Rogers’s 
results are intriguing indeed. They can be evaded, however, if one can 
conceive ways in which individual learners enhance their fitness when 
there are imitators in the population. In further modeling (Boyd and 
Richerson, 2005, cap. 2), they explore two ways in which this might 
happen.
a] Imitation enhances the fitness of individual learners by making 
them m ore selective: they rely on imitation when they cannot tell by 
themselves which behavior is best (according to a particular learning 
rule), given the environmental conditions. Therefore, imitation low­
ers the costs of error in those conditions in which it is difficult to learn 
individually the adaptive behavior.
b] Imitation makes possible a cumulative culture, that is, a set of be­
haviors that cannot be learned by individual learning in a lifespan.
Figure 3 shows in what ways Rogers’s previous results are evaded 
when conditions a or b are satisfied. I will focus on the scenario b, in 
which we do have complex behaviors available for imitation.
5] W hen the results of Rogers’s models are eluded, we are, however, 
back to the initial puzzle: there are kinds of culture in other species 
but nothing comparable to a complex culture. In other words, if the 
availability of a new inheritance system (besides the genetic one) en-
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Figure 3. If the existence of imitators in the population reduces the cost of 
individual learning, or increases its possibilities and precision/correctedness, 
the fitness of the population as a whole increases. This is the case if imita­
tors makes possible cultural accumulation: individual learning doesn’t have to 
start, as if were, from scratch. From Boyd and Richerson, 2005, p. 39.”
hances the average fitness of a population, why did it not evolve, as far 
as we presently know, in the great apes lineages, for example, which 
had to cope with similar environmental pressures as our own lineage?
6] The empirical evidence ju st referred to suggests that the models 
built hitherto  did not capture something essential to the process: 
“models do not usually ju st fail; they fail for particular reasons that 
are often very informative” (ibid.; Richerson and Boyd, 2005: 98).
Model failure has, therefore, a heuristic value, pointing to factors 
that were opaque to unaided intuition:
We have suggested that the ability of culture to couple individual learning 
to a transmission mechanism, thus to generate a system for the inheritance 
of acquired variation, could cause capacities for culture to evolve. However, 
this analysis also fails because it suggests that the advantages of culture are 
quite general, and hence that many organisms ought to have “Lamarckian” 
systems of inheritance. This failure in turn suggests that there are other costs 
to the inheritance of acquired variation that must be accounted for (Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005: 409).
In their first models, Richerson and Boyd assumed that learning 
by imitation had no costs. The failure of these models led them  to
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propose the following hypothesis: imitation requires a special-purpose 
psychological mechanism. Other modalities of social learning, such 
as local enhancement or stimulus intensification require just the very same 
general-purpose psychological mechanisms as individual learning. Em­
pirical evidence and theoretical results point to the limitations of the 
latter mechanisms to support social learning by imitation, or observa­
tional learning, which would require dedicated cognitive processing 
of some kind.11
7] The introduction, in the new models, of the costs of the capacity 
for culture on top of the costs of individual learning, illuminate Rich- 
erson and Boyd’s strategy of manipulating simple models to find out 
what the relevant parameters are.
In the following steps I will take for granted that a cumulative cul­
ture, based on a new system of inheritance, requires a special-purpose 
psychological capacity for observational learning: mindreading (or a 
theory of m ind).
8] When the costs of this psychological machinery for observational 
learning are taken into account in the 1996 models (Boyd and Rich- 
erson, 2005, cap. 3), however, we obtain as a result an adaptive val­
ley!
This result can be grasped qualitatively as follows: if there are no 
imitators in the population, a complex culture cannot arise since it 
requires a faithful mechanism for the transmission of information. If 
there is no previous accumulation of culture (and, therefore, no com­
plex behaviors available), the first individual who happens to be able 
to imitate (e.g. by some kind of weird mutation) would not be fitter 
than the others: on the contrary, she pays the costs of the machinery 
but does not benefit from using it. This argument assumes that indi­
vidual learning, or less costly social learning modalities, is sufficient 
for acquiring the behaviors that are adaptive. In these conditions, imi­
tation cannot evolve at all.
Is the adaptive valley that follows from the modeling a robust result, 
despite the simplifications and idealizations that have been made?
11 Even though Richerson and Boyd are not committed to the massive-modularity 
view of the mind that evolutionary psychologists argue for, the properties usually attrib­
uted to a cognitive module—they are innate, encapsulated and domain-specific—help 
to capture the idea of a special-purpose mechanism.
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Richerson and Boyd are convinced that there is an obstacle for the 
evolution of individuals capable to learn by observation:
The exhaustive analysis of many sample models in various combinations is 
also the main means of seeking robust results [...] One way to gain confi­
dence in simple models is to construct several models embodying different 
characterizations of the problem of interest and different simplifying assump­
tions. If the results of a model are robust, the same qualitative results ought to 
obtain for a whole family of related models in which the supposedly extrane­
ous details differ (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 410).
9] Supposing the existence of an adaptive valley, in which ways could 
it be crossed, by humans, at least? Richerson and Boyd propose a 
“roundabout path” along the lines of the so-called “social intelligence 
hypothesis”:
If such an impediment to the evolution of complex traditions existed, evolu­
tion must have traveled a roundabout path to get the theory of mind mod­
ule (or whatever) past the threshold necessary for bringing it under positive 
selection for the cumulative cultural adaptation. Some have suggested that 
primate intelligence was originally an adaptation to manage a complex social 
life... [social problems favored] a sophisticated ability to take the perspective 
of others. Such a capacity might incidentally make imitation possible, launch­
ing the evolution of the most elementary form of complex cultural traditions. 
Once elementary complex cultural traditions exist, the threshold is crossed 
(Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 139).
According with this hypothesis, m indreading abilities would be, 
actually, an exaptation of a Machiavellian intelligence, which evolved 
to solve adaptive problems in a social environm ent (and not to make 
cultural accumulation possible). In figure 4, I try to capture this 
idea.
A presupposition of this account is, therefore, that Machiavel­
lian intelligence and imitation require the very same ability to adopt 
the perspective of the other (that is, to make imputations of mental 
states).
Is the adaptationist puzzle solved after all? At first sight it is not: 
this roundabout path could have been traveled by other species, such 
as the great apes, that also lived in complex physical and social envi-
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EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL LEARNING BY IMITATION
Adaptive
valley
Evolution of som e  








Evolution of cognitive abilities to face  
social complexity (theory of mind)
Social environment pressures
Figure 4. The roundabout path that made possible the evolution of the cogni­
tive abilities required for cultural accumulation. Is it a plausible account?
ronments! All Richerson and Boyd have to offer, in face of the persis­
tence of the puzzle, is the proposal that humans held possession first 
of the cultural niche. This niche can be occupied by those species 
which have a new inter-generational mechanism for the transmission 
of information:
This argument provides one explanation for the rarity of cumulative cultur­
al tradition: humans were the first species to chance on some devious path 
around this constraint, and then we have preempted most of the niches re­
quiring culture, inhibiting the evolution of any competitors (Boyd and Rich­
erson, 2005: 16).
This proposal is not very convincing though and looks like an ad 
hoc way out of the puzzle. Can we conceive other plausible trajecto­
ries across the adaptive valley? Abrantes (2006) and Abrantes (2010) 
explores compatibilist and niche construction scenarios for human 
evolution which can be explored in order to devise alternative hy­
potheses. These scenarios avoid also nativism concerning mindread- 
ing abilities, which is congenial to Richerson and Boyd’s account.
With these remarks, I conclude this reconstruction. I hope it il­
lustrates the methods used by Richerson and Boyd in their attempts
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to understand a particular dimension of hum an evolution, and also 
some of their metascientific theses.12
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